I begin with a confession: my interest in instrumental discourse started with a joke. A few weeks into a graduate course focused on studying various theories of technical communication, we read Patrick Moore’s “Instrumental Discourse Is as Humanistic as Rhetoric.” It was my first serious introduction to the concept, and I found Moore’s central idea—that certain uses of language are nonrhetorical, or “instrumental”—an interesting departure from the prevailing theories we had been studying. When the class met to discuss the article, however, I found that many of my fellow students saw not a viable theory of communication, but a heavy-handed diatribe. Moore’s article spawned a running joke among my classmates, based on Moore’s emphatic contention that “too many institutions can be destroyed, and too many people can get hurt or die if teachers, scholars, and universities continue to ignore the instrumental aims of discourse” (115). (A quick count shows that Moore mentions the lifesaving power of instrumental discourse at least six separate times in this article.) For weeks afterward, when someone in the class mentioned the ethical dilemmas faced by technical communicators or the mundane realities of the workplace world, one of my peers would invariably respond, “But technical communication saves lives!”

I have spent a considerable amount of time thinking about why we found humor in Moore’s rather serious article, and I have concluded that Moore’s insistence that discourse saves lives became a joke for many of the same reasons his ideas have been pilloried by the academy. For Moore, instrumental discourse is an all-or-nothing proposition. It is not enough for technical communication to make users’ lives easier; it must save their lives. It is not enough for instrumental discourse to be recognized by his colleagues; it must be privileged. Moore is no dabbler, content to advance an idea and explore it with the input of his colleagues. He is a true believer, a zealot for the cause of instrumental discourse.

Moore’s critics, however, are legion, and there seem to exist several fundamental gaps between Moore and his detractors. Many in the technical communication academic community have taken issue with instrumental discourse because it isn’t “humanistic” enough (Miller, “Comment”; Johnson; Kreth; Grobman, “Multiculturalism”); Moore has countered by charging that his opponents “oversimplify and trivialize” his work (“Pluralism” 83). Occasionally, other scholars have defended Moore’s ideas (most notably John Hagge and Janice Redish), but I will frame my discussion of the debate in terms of Moore vs. his critics, rather than instrumentalists vs. “ideological critics” (as Melinda Kreth does), simply because this seems to be less a debate between two camps than a debate between Moore and the rest of the technical communication community. The fact that Moore has a few lonely supporters does not change the fact that this is his fight.

This article traces the ongoing debate surrounding instrumental discourse in technical communication scholarship and identifies steps that scholars should take to increase the efficacy of this debate. I begin by briefly reviewing instrumental discourse scholarship in the field of technical communication. Next, I examine several barriers preventing a useful discussion on this topic. I then offer suggestions for a more productive conversation about instrumental discourse. I conclude by proposing topics for further consideration by the technical communication community. In doing so, I will not align myself with either Moore or his critics, because my focus is less the merits of instrumental discourse itself than the way the idea is being discussed in scholarly technical communication journals.

An Overview Of Instrumental Discourse Scholarship

Patrick Moore did not coin the term instrumental discourse, but over the past ten years he has made it his own by being its chief proponent in the field of technical communication. Before I discuss Moore’s use of the term, I should note that other academic fields use the term instrumental discourse quite differently than Moore does. For instance, two scholars working in social psychology discuss instrumental discourse in relation to illocutionary discourse and civil discourse, with instrumental discourse defined as “trying to convince others to accept our position and perspective as the right one” (Curran and Takata). This definition, and others used by scholars in varying disciplines, has little relation to this discussion, but I include it here to show that we are dealing with a slippery topic, one that takes on different connotations as it moves from one discipline to another.

Moore’s use of the term is informed by several scholars, but he relies heavily on two specific definitions. First, Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and Alan Janik define instrumental discourse as “those utterances that are supposed to achieve their purpose directly, as they stand, without the need to produce any additional ‘reasons’ or ‘supporting arguments’” (qtd. in Moore, “Pluralism” 75). The second definition, offered by Walter Beale, states that the purpose of instrumental discourse “is the governance, guidance, control, or execution of human activities” (qtd. in Moore, “Pluralism” 75). To simplify these definitions even further, it may help to view instrumental discourse as communication that is designed to help the user complete a specific task. As I will show, the definition of instrumental discourse is fundamental to this discussion, for much of the confusion and disagreement among scholars can be traced to a lack of consensus on terminology.

Theoretical debates often encourage dichotomies, and the discussion about instrumental discourse is no exception. To greatly simplify this dichotomy, we can divide instrumental discourse scholarship into two groups: Moore and non-Moore. Viewed historically, the scholarship can be subdivided into three conversations, with Moore as the central figure in each. I will also briefly review a handful outlying articles that do not belong to any of the three specific conversations.

Miller, Moore, and Kreth

In 1996, Patrick Moore published “Instrumental Discourse Is as Humanistic as Rhetoric,” which is, among other things, a response to Carolyn R. Miller’s seminal 1979 article “A Humanistic Rationale for Technical Writing.” Moore’s article prompted immediate negative reactions from Miller and Melinda Kreth, which appeared in the Journal of Business and Technical Communication two issues after Moore’s initial article. Moore responds to Miller and Kreth in the same issue of JBTC, at which point the conversation seems to stop. Because this conversation establishes a model that the others follow, a longer review of the articles herein will illuminate several trends that reappear throughout the other conversations.

In “A Humanistic Rationale for Technical Writing,” Carolyn R. Miller argues for greater allegiance between technical communication and the humanities. This bold article attacks the traditional positivist view of technical communication pedagogy as “coercive and tyrannical” (616) and characterizes the goal of technical communication as finding “an efficient way of coercing minds to submit to reality” (610). Miller’s stated aim is to “provide a basis for seeing technical writing as a more humanistic and less coercive endeavor” (611). Her use of “coercive” as an antonym to “humanistic” is telling—she clearly opposes the traditional view of technical writing. Miller goes on to write that “technical writing as it is commonly taught is shot through with positivist assumptions, which destroy its aspirations toward disciplinary respectability and relegate it to its status as a skills course” (613). Again, her choice of words—the pejorative use of “skills course”—reveals a great deal about her vision of technical communication, which seems to privilege the academy over the workplace. Further, when Miller writes of her desire for “disciplinary respectability,” she is clearly seeking the approval of other humanistic—not scientific or workplace—disciplines.

Patrick Moore’s “Instrumental Discourse Is as Humanistic as Rhetoric” is a confrontational response to Miller and other humanistic theorists who, according to Moore, “are concerned about technical communication because they believe that instrumental or nonrhetorical uses of language have a dubious moral value” (100). Moore argues that “these and other critics try to define technical communication as rhetoric so that they can make it more palatable to themselves and to other academic audiences” (101). Where others see a moral danger in pedagogy that focuses too heavily on the workplace, Moore sees a practical danger in pedagogy that dismisses the workplace entirely by expanding the definition of rhetoric to include all technical communication:

Any all-inclusive definition of a term, when it is wielded by professors who have administrative authority, legitimacy, or some other kind of power over others, can be used as a means to dominate and control; if applied inappropriately, such a manipulative use of language may not prepare students well for how technical communication is practiced in the marketplace. (104)

Even the use of the term “marketplace” sets Moore apart from other technical communication scholars as being more concerned with praxis than theory. Moore concludes by staging one more attack on the ivory tower: “Too many rhetoric professors forget that people must use language to get things done” (115). (For a more thorough—though admittedly biased—consideration of Miller’s and Moore’s pieces, see Hagge.)

Kreth and Miller respond to Moore in kind. Kreth argues that Moore’s concerns about the undue emphasis of rhetoric in technical communication pedagogy are unwarranted, and that “broad or multiple definitions of rhetoric do not present a problem” to the discipline (477). She goes on to argue that “even when instrumental discourse appears useful and humane,” instructors should teach their students to question it by asking, “Whose interests does such discourse serve? For what purposes? Who decides and how? Who might be harmed by such discourse?” (480). Likewise, Miller challenges Moore to acknowledge the potential for harm caused by instrumental discourse, asking, “In the course of doing good does it do any damage?” (485). Miller contends that Moore creates an unnecessary division “between rhetoric and instrumental discourse” (482), noting that “rhetoric is the best way I know for understanding the instrumental dimensions of discourse” (483).

In his response to Miller and Kreth, Moore labels his challengers as “totalizing rhetoricians” who, in order to “accrue and maintain power … rationalize away any precise or limiting definitions that, in effect, divide the intellectual territory that these rhetoricians want to control” (491). He charges that “Miller and Kreth insinuate persuasion into all discourse by assuming that if discourse involves an audience, then it must be overtly or covertly rhetorical,” and laments that “totalizing rhetoricians conflate [audience analysis and persuasion] in order to turn all discourse into overt or covert persuasion” (494). Moore concludes by stating that until rhetoricians “recognize the theoretical, pedagogical, social, and economic value of distinguishing different categories of discourse … this debate will continue” (501).

Johnson and Moore

Early in his 1998 article “Complicating Technology: Interdisciplinary Method, the Burden of Comprehension, and the Ethical Space of the Technical Communicator,” Robert R. Johnson asserts that “arguments for an instrumental approach to technical communication illuminate vividly the profession’s entrapment within, and comfort with, the role of the technical communicator as mere scribe” (76). This brief reference to Moore’s 1996 piece provokes a twelve-page response by Moore in Technical Communication Quarterly, in which Moore attempts to dispel “Myths about Instrumental Discourse.” Moore charges that “Johnson seems to trivialize and dismiss instrumental discourse” (211), and that Johnson overlooked Moore’s statement that “technical communicators do much more than write” (213). Moore reiterates his belief that technical communicators are not “mere scribes” (213) as he addresses this and five other “myths” he believes are held by technical communication scholars. Johnson publishes a brief response attached to Moore’s article, arguing that Moore “takes instrumental discourse far beyond any definition held by Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, or even Walter Beale” (225). Johnson concludes by saying, “Until a more satisfying theory and rationale for technical communication practice emerges, I’ll stick with rhetoric” (225–26).

Grobman and Moore

Laurie Grobman’s 1999 article “Beyond Internationalization: Multicultural Education in the Professional Writing Contact Zone,” is another piece that briefly mentions instrumental discourse. Although Moore’s work is not the focus of Grobman’s piece, she does argue that “Moore’s claims about the instrumental model of professional discourse may actually provide further evidence of its limitations in explaining even a narrow band of technical discourse in an age of internationalization” (430). This short but bold critique inspires a ten-page response by Moore in the following issue of JBTC. Here Moore charges Grobman with turning “instrumental discourse into a straw man to advance her point of view” and claims that “the best approach to technical communication pedagogy is pluralistic” (74). Moore goes on to refute four specific points of Grobman’s article and then explores the “limits of social construction” (80), concluding that “no single theoretical approach can do justice to the complexity of professional communication” (82).

Additional Articles

In order to provide a thorough list of instrumental discourse scholarship, I mention a few additional articles here, though these pieces have not generated the volume or intensity of response found in the three previous conversations. Shortly after Moore’s initial discussion of instrumental discourse appeared, John Hagge published “Ethics, Words, and the World in Moore’s and Miller’s Accounts of Scientific Technical Discourse.” Hagge explicitly states that he is writing “to support Moore’s position” (461), and several of the arguments he makes echo Moore’s. To the best of my knowledge, there has never been a detailed response to Hagge’s article. Janice Redish comments on Moore’s 1996 article alongside Miller and Kreth, but I categorize her piece here because it falls outside the confrontational conversation among Moore, Miller, and Kreth. Like Hagge, Redish writes to support Moore’s ideas, but Redish focuses on finding “ways to include practitioners, their views, their realities, and their needs” in technical communication scholarship (486). Redish contends that “rhetoric is not the only theory that informs good technical communication” and argues for greater acceptance of “pragmatic research in technical communication” (486–87). Again, I know of no substantive response to the ideas that Redish advances. Finally, Moore’s 1997 article on the pedagogy of instrumental discourse, “Rhetorical vs. Instrumental Approaches to Teaching Technical Communication,” has gone largely unchallenged. I doubt this is a result of Moore softening his delivery or abandoning his strongly held beliefs—which he doesn’t; instead, it relates to the fact that this article appears not in of JBTC or TCQ, but in Technical Communication, a journal aimed at workplace practitioners.

The discussion about instrumental discourse has been dormant for five years (Grobman’s response to Moore is the last serious discussion of the theory), but it clearly remains unresolved. Although important questions still need to be addressed, there exist several barriers to effective communication that must be overcome first. In the following sections, I discuss those barriers and offer suggestions that may help us avoid much of the unproductive dialogue that characterizes the scholarship I have reviewed here.

Barriers to Productive Discussion

Much of the disagreement between Moore and his detractors stems from the fact that they define key terms in very different ways. Further damaging the prospects for productive discourse is the manner in which these scholars converse with one another. Throughout his career, Moore has exhibited a proclivity for writing about controversial topics within the academy (see “Rethinking”; “When Persuasion Fails”). The theory of instrumental discourse, however, has been especially volatile in the technical communication community. Moore’s work purposefully challenges the deep-seated beliefs of many academics, and his foes have responded in force. I do not have the space to catalog every barrier to a productive discussion, but I identify a few problematic areas that are key to the debate.

The Problematic Origins of Instrumentalism

On its face, Moore’s use of the word “instrumental” seems appropriate. But a closer examination of the term reveals several problematic connotations. Moore relies on Beal, Killingsworth, and Toulmin et al. for his definitions of instrumental discourse. But he neglects the work of Max Horkeimer, for whom instrumentalism was an inherently negative concept. As Killingsworth notes, “Horkheimer cautioned, ‘It is also true that men are acting more and more like machines’” (Killingsworth). Killingsworth goes on to state that documents motivated by instrumental rationality have as their sole purpose control of the documents’ readers. This is what Killingsworth refers to as the “dark side of instrumentalism,” noting that

just as rhetoricians must ever worry about the association of their discipline with the excess of propaganda and advertising, instrumentalists must account for the association of their characteristic discourse not only with the aesthetic dullness of the technological enterprise but also with the more sinister aspects of mechanization and social control. (Killingsworth)

Curtis Bowman defines instrumental reason as “the capacity for selecting the appropriate means to our ends, whatever they happen to be. That is, we use reason as an instrument to guide us in attaining our ends” (emphasis mine). This is not the same concept Moore champions, but Moore’s reliance on the term may confuse readers who are familiar with definitions such as those put forward by Horkheimer and Bowman.

This problem of multiple definitions is illustrated by one of Miller’s statements. When she quotes Hauser as saying that “rhetoric is an instrumental use of language” (483, italics in original), she is plainly using the term instrumental in a different fashion than Moore uses it. Hauser’s definition is much broader than Moore’s, and neither definition acknowledges the multiple definitions offered by scholars working in other fields or the connotations inherent in Horkheimer’s original use of the term. I am not suggesting that scholars must always agree about how to define key terms in their fields (indeed, some of the debates most fundamental to academia are about definitions). The problem here, however, is not one of disagreement about how to define a single term within a discipline, but of a single term being used by different disciplines to mean different things. As long as there exists a misunderstanding about the origins and connotations of instrumental discourse, a fruitful discussion of the theory as it applies to technical communication is impossible.

Humane Is Not Humanistic

Another problem of definition stems from the overuse of the vague term humanistic. Moore and his critics use the words humanistic and humane interchangeably, but they seem to be talking about two different concepts. For instance, in her defense of Moore, Redish lists several skills students need to be taught to succeed in the workplace: “interviewing techniques … critical thinking skills … interpersonal negotiating skills, and an understanding of users as individuals and as members of discourse communities” (487). Redish then comments, “These are humanistic skills” (487). But whose definition of humanistic is Redish using? As Miller, Kreth, and others use the term, humanistic concepts are closely tied to academic field of humanities. When Moore and Redish use the term, they seem to mean humane, which can be interpreted as something beneficial to humans, something that makes users’ lives easier. Conflating the two terms introduces another gap into the conversation, one which must be resolved for a substantive discussion to occur.

Larger Issues of Definition

During the past fifty years, technical communication has undergone a sea change in the way scholars and practitioners approach the subject. In the years since Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver published The Mathematical Theory of Communication, technical communication has entered the academy and has become aligned—with some exceptions—with the humanities, as signaled by Miller’s 1979 piece. Most technical communication programs are now firmly entrenched in English departments, but this relationship has been an uneasy one (see Mendelson). Russell Rutter suggests that “technical communication needs to associate itself, more than it has so far, with that heightened form of conversation called liberal education. It needs to associate itself more closely with the traditions of rhetoric and humane learning” (22).

Obviously, Moore disagrees with Rutter and other scholars who push for a greater allegiances with the humanities, which may be one reason Moore’s work has become such a lightning rod in the field. The idea of instrumental discourse can be seen as undermining the attempts of technical communicators to achieve legitimacy in the humanities. Moore is arguing for greater acceptance of instrumental discourse, but he’s arguing with people who are busy arguing for greater acceptance of technical communication in the field of rhetoric. Those scholars, in turn, are arguing for greater prominence of rhetoric in English departments they perceive as privileging literature (see Mendelson). Moore claims that “for a definition to be useful, it must be precise” (“Response” 492), but taken to the extreme, this philosophy could prove detrimental to the field of technical communication as a whole, for there are those in university English departments who believe that technical communication falls outside the definition of “English Studies” or even the humanities. In this case, a broad definition seems to serve us as technical communicators.

The debate rests on a shaky foundation

Moore’s discussion of instrumental discourse can be read as an endorsement of the transmission model of communication (see Thayer), which has clearly fallen out of favor in technical communication scholarship. As Jennifer Daryl Slack and her coauthors point out, the transmission model “has been extensively critiqued and often maligned such that it is nearly requisite to begin any introductory text on communication theory with an explanation and rejection of it” (15). Moore’s articles, however, bypass a review of communication theory altogether in favor of evangelism for a theory that rests squarely on a transmission-view foundation. By advancing his ideas on instrumental discourse without shoring up support for the transmission view of communication, Moore fails to two account for decades of research in technical communication.

An example from another debate in the field may further illustrate this point. In his review of user-centered design, Clay Spinuzzi points out that “few if any technical communication scholars advocate a system-centered view; system-centered design functions almost exclusively as a straw person, a demonstrably poor choice in contrast with the more favored user-centered design” (6). Spinuzzi seems to suggest that scholars use the system-centered view as a straw person not because of some flaw in the scholars’ logic, but because it actually is inferior to the user-centered view. Some opponents of instrumental discourse may see a parallel here, with instrumental discourse not as a straw man, but as thoroughly discredited theory not worthy of a lengthy review. However, I am not convinced that instrumental discourse has been conclusively proven inherently inferior or somehow unworthy of serious consideration. Both Moore and his critics share the blame here, and all should pay greater attention to the underlying theories upon which their work relies.

Both parties resort to personal attacks and loaded words

The conversation about instrumental discourse is marked by an unusually high level of antagonism, which stifles the opportunity for true debate. I note only a few examples of such attacks here, but they are plentiful in the articles I review above.

In refuting Johnson, Moore writes that “Johnson cited [Moore’s 1996] article, but apparently did not read it, and he certainly has not refuted it” (“Myths” 217). Grobman describes the instrumentalist model as “simplistic” (“Beyond” 430). Moore claims that Miller “misstates the purpose of technical communication” (to which Miller ably responds [485]). Moore’s response to Grobman (“Pluralism”) is another excellent example. Over the course of ten pages, Moore labels Grobman as close-minded (74), claims that she “trivializes” his remarks (76), and declares himself the winner of a conflict in which Grobman has yet to respond (80). Surely these are not productive arguments. Attacks of this kind signal to the other participants in the discussion that the author is looking for a fight, not a true dialogue. Again, this is a small sample of the attacks being levied by both Moore and his detractors. These attacks, for the most part, center on petty quibbles, not on substantive issues. If the discussion on instrumental discourse does not become more focused on the essence of the debate, it will never progress.

Suggestions for a More Productive Discussion

As I have shown, the conversation about instrumental discourse can be a frustrating one for all participants. To break the stalemate, Moore and his opponents must find ways to compromise. I am not suggesting that either side should abandon its theoretical framework or forsake its central arguments, but small steps could go a long way toward alleviating the current state of gridlock and promoting a more substantive conversation. I will identify four potential solutions here.

A New Terminology

In a 1999 Technical Communication article, David K. Farkas coined the term “procedural discourse,” which “refers to written and spoken discourse that guides people in performing a task” (Farkas). This definition sounds familiar because it is—procedural discourse has many things in common with Moore’s concept of instrumental discourse. Farkas’s piece, however, has not generated the kind of negative response that Moore’s articles have. Granted, Farkas does not attempt to tackle the definition of rhetoric in the way Moore does (Farkas even comments that “procedural discourse, like all discourse, is always rhetorical in nature”), but I suspect that the absence of a negative reaction in the technical communication community is due, at least in part, to Farkas’s use of a different set of terms.

Ideally, Patrick Moore could be persuaded to abandon the term “instrumental discourse” in favor of a less charged alternative, such as “procedural discourse” or “task-oriented discourse.” Realistically, however, such a move on Moore’s part is unlikely. Therefore, Moore’s critics should accept—even grudgingly—his use of the term to mean nonpersuasive, task-oriented discourse. Until we can move past the negative connotations associated with instrumental discourse, we will never have a truly productive discussion about the concept.

A Shift in Focus

In the same vein, technical communication scholars should focus on the merits of Moore’s ideas rather than the way he packages them. If Moore insists that instrumental discourse is not rhetorical, then those who respond to Moore need to approach instrumental discourse as something other than persuasive writing, even if their definitions of rhetoric include nonpersuasive discourse. Otherwise, the argument becomes one of definition, in which scholars debate the meaning of rhetoric and technical communication rather than the validity (or lack thereof) of Moore’s ideas. I do not mean to suggest that Moore’s detractors have entirely ignored the substance of his arguments, but far too much of the debate about instrumental discourse has focused on definitions of peripherally related terms. Unless we can accept the notion that different scholars have different definitions for key terms in their field, we will never have a valuable conversation about instrumental discourse.

Concessions

Next, Moore and his opponents need to establish a middle ground, where a more civil debate can take place. For instance, Moore states that sometimes technical communication must be “rigorously unambiguous.” I believe most technical communication instructors would agree with this statement, and the instrumental discourse debate would profit from a greater recognition of such statements.

On the other hand, Moore needs to more fully admit the limitations of instrumental discourse. In his response to Grobman, Moore writes, “All theories have limits—including instrumental discourse theory” (“Pluralism” 80), but he then proceeds to identify four limits of social construction, not instrumental discourse. It would be a bold step for Moore to write openly about the shortcomings of instrumental discourse instead of merely mentioning in passing that such shortcomings exist, and to do so would bolster his credibility with his adversaries. By making a concession of this kind, Moore could also signal to other scholars that his ideas are open for expansion and interpretation.

Laurie Grobman provides an excellent model for gracefully conceding a point without abandoning any substantive academic ground. In her response to Moore’s critique, she writes, “I intended to summarize rather than oversimplify instrumental discourse, and, like any attempt to summarize a large and complex body of work, my effort may have omitted some of its nuances” (“Multiculturalism” 93). If others would follow Grobman’s example, the discussion about instrumental discourse would be less hostile and more effective.

Greater Participation

Finally, a more productive debate necessitates greater participation by technical communication scholars. Surely there are scholars other than John Hagge and Janice Redish who find value in task-oriented discourse, and the ongoing debate of this topic would benefit from their participation. For his part, Moore needs to allow others to respond rather than dominating the discussion. At present, Moore’s status as the champion of instrumental discourse gives him unwarranted control over its definition. If Moore is the first (and only) respondent to the opponents of instrumental discourse, then instrumental discourse must be whatever he says it is. Moore certainly should be given credit for heightening the profile of instrumental discourse in the field of technical communication, but there is danger in allowing one scholar to “own” an idea. As others join the debate, a more balanced discussion will emerge.

Conclusion; Suggestions for Further Consideration

The debate over instrumental discourse is symptomatic of a larger debate in our field, one concerned with definitions of technical communication and rhetoric. These conversations have no end in sight; likewise, the conversation about instrumental discourse (or procedural discourse, or task-oriented discourse) is just beginning. Despite its rocky start, I believe there is a place in technical communication scholarship for this discussion. In particular, I see the need for consideration of several topics related to instrumental discourse.

First, we should pay greater attention to the role of ethics in instrumental discourse. Many scholars who criticize Moore seem especially concerned (and rightly so) with the ethical implications of technical communication. Even if we grant instrumental discourse status as a nonpersuasive form of communication, we must acknowledge that it has its own set of ethical challenges that demand attention. Second, we should explore more fully the tensions between the workplace and the academy as they relate to instrumental discourse. Are we providing technical communication students with the type of training they need to succeed in the workplace? Even if we as instructors have this as our primary goal, are we in a position to accomplish it? Last, we should include previously neglected audiences in the discussion of instrumental discourse. If, as Moore suggests, “real world” technical communicators rely on instrumental discourse, then their input is invaluable to the debate. If articles on instrumental discourse appeared more frequently in Intercom (or even Technical Communication) than they do in JBTC and TCQ, practitioners would be more likely to read and respond to them. And this topic seems particularly well suited to a conversation between academic theorists and workplace professionals.

Instrumental discourse is a topic ripe for discussion, and these are just three points worthy of exploration. As scholars of all stripes—humanists, positivists, pragmatists, instrumentalists—engage themselves more fully in the discussion of instrumental discourse, the field of technical communication, both in the academy and the workplace, will reap the benefits.

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